UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Gary Mosher
147 Ironia Rd
Mendham NJ 07945
973 543-6003
Plaintiff Pro-Se
____________________________________
Mosher, Gary
Plaintiff
VS. The State of New Jersey
&
Judge Deanne M. Wilson,
Judge William Hunt Dumont,
Judge Dennis Cavanaugh,
Patriot Media
Defendants ____________________________________ |
CIVIL ACTION No. 06-2526
Brief in answer to defendant Cavanaugh motion for summary judgment citing absolute immunity. |
Oral Argument REQUESTED.
I. The Concept Itself.... Putting Immunity On Trial
II. Defining Jurisdiction And A Judicial Act.
III. Regarding The "Adequate" Alternative Legal Remedies:
IV. Regarding Citations and Authorities:
V. Regarding Requested Suspension Of Discovery:
VI. Near End Statement:
VII. Conclusion:
I. The Concept Itself.... Putting Immunity On Trial
1. Meaning no personal disrespect to the intelligence I am challenging, I sincerely believe, and reasonably claim, that absolute immunity is on its face absolute nonsense. Subjected to a fair trial "absolute" judicial immunity loses, as it has no merit as being minimally cost-effective, let alone merit as a "necessity".
2. The often recited court wisdom that the law should not be any more onerous than the relief it intends requires... Is logic of eternal credibility. However, the argument that a judge cannot freely exercise reasonable and responsible independence, without possessing absolute license to act unreasonably and irresponsibly, has no such obvious credibility. In fact, I would claim such an argument offends the core logic that defines Constitutional Justice. Accountability, for the damage we do to the rights of others, is what makes American "freedom" substantially perfect and distinctly different from dictatorship, chaos, or anarchy.
3. Federal judges can be fairly argued to be the most powerful people in this country, even without judicial immunity, with it, they are given an absolute power that practically guarantees absolute corruption. In the case of police officers for example: It is common sense recognition of the dangerous potential of corruption, that parallels power, that justifies the sensible public perception that a greater standard of accountability, and deterrence, is required.... and most certainly not a lesser one.
4. Absolute judicial immunity finds its origins in "the king's justice" and not in any composition of the creators of the American "we the accountable people" experiment. Judicial immunity does not exist at the public's request or demand, it is a internal contrivance of a elitist political machine that has no sincere reverence for the public interest. This is a judicial cheat intended to destroy justice, and the America I was propagandized to believe existed... in my ignorant youth.
5. In simple terms absolute immunity is an extreme nuclear solution, when a firecracker would've sufficed. I emphatically make the simple claim that judges can be protected from harassment, and intimidation, without providing the nonsensical remedy of absolute immunity. The Courts, and the State, have expended no energy developing a fair (less extreme and I would claim less destructive) alternative. It is the reckless, convenient, easy answer, not the best answer, and certainly cannot survive the strict scrutiny it deserves.
Regarding the Legal Precedent:
6. The courts have exchanged absolute protection from "some notion" of judicial intimidation, for a grotesque judicial arrogance that certainly has destroyed constitutional rights. That is the bargain case law attempts to justify, and I would claim no intellectually honest person could deny that the justification falls woefully short. The subject has not been completely hashed out and I would claim there is yet no definitive (perfect) logic precisely defining or defending the established law on the subject. I believe anemic facts render you hard-pressed to demonstrate what the people have gained. On the other hand, there is abundant evidence demonstrating catastrophic abuses imposed by the arrogance and bigotry empowered by absolute immunity.
7. Absolute judicial immunity is mushy law, built on corrupt purpose, which lies on ground that has no American soul. It's not just bad law, its an evil treason to the "absolute" fairness America aspires to provide. There is no crime against justice for a judge to be appropriately "intimidated" into acting within a "reasonable" interpretation of the rules of the court and the United States Constitution. To argue otherwise gives rational license to nonsense, and logical consistency would oblige that, for example, we abolish laws against slander, as such laws place a prohibitive burden on the exercise of First Amendment Rights. The legal theory is the same, and the legal theory preserves no honorable liberty, and in fact, threatens the core accountability and justice upon which useful liberty depends.
8. In conclusion on the general subject, to sustain absolute judicial immunity as a necessity, requires you to be willing to argue that you can give the aggrieved nothing as you have no choice but to allow maliciousness and bigotry to run free... you are stating that no efficient filter capable of separating reasonable judicial acts from unreasonable ones can be constructed. This is the argument that must necessarily be part of the defense of absolute immunity and it is frankly preposterous enough to insult even common intelligence, and to be fairly characterized as just plain silly.
II. Defining Jurisdiction and a Judicial Act.
9. A "judicial act" by literal definition implies a lawful act, and an act showing discipline and respect commensurate to the oath to the United States Constitution sworn to. An act of plain unadulterated tyranny should by its very nature--and to preserve the integrity of the court--be excluded from any reasonable definition of "judicial in nature". Clearly case law sees with a less direct eye and indulges in a mincing, dicing, and slicing of words and their meaning till rationality loses "jurisdiction" over the "subject matter".
Defendant Council states:
10. "Certainly, the acts for which he is being sued - issuing decisions and orders as the neutral in an earlier litigation involving the plaintiff - are the very embodiment of acts which are judicial in nature."
11. I would counter that judge Cavanaugh is not being sued for making a decision as a neutral, he is being sued for maliciously destroying litigation, and a constitutional right, as an ideological partisan.
Again quoting:
12. "these acts were taken in connection with a federal case raising issues of federal law, filed in federal court, and involving parties in interest who offered no valid jurisdictional objection to the Court's presiding over the matter."
13. There is a gross dishonesty in claiming that no party objected to the court's jurisdiction, when in fact the judge had destroyed the litigation before any defendant had even answered the summons.
14. Undeniably, Judge Cavanaugh is a federal judge who was presumably (can only presume without discovery) given authority/jurisdiction over my litigation through regular court process. If all the judge has to do to maintain jurisdiction is to first appropriately gain jurisdiction, than I would suppose there's nothing to argue. On the other hand, I'm of the opinion that a judge can lose jurisdiction the moment he/she steps beyond the confines of a reasonable interpretation of the court rules and the United States Constitution. The rules of fair process cannot exist within the judge's "jurisdiction" to make and break as he wishes. I would simply argue that if a judge breaks rules, or makes up rules, all jurisdiction is lost because required due (equal) process has been destroyed. When a jury has been potentially corrupted, judges do not wait until after their verdict, to invalidate, and declare a mistrial. In essence the moment a corruption takes place, is the moment the jury's "jurisdiction" ends as a viable and relevant component of due process.
15. The text composing judge Cavanaugh's' order to dismiss may have been properly formatted, but that was the only thing proper about it. The recorded facts demonstrate, that there was no proper (within the rules) motion to dismiss, and no proper opportunity for the fair argument the rules require. Under the minimum requirements of a summary judgment motion I would of at least had some hope of understanding the deficiency the judge was claiming. Without the protection of court rules, one clearly can't fairly litigate claims and I would suggest equally clearly, under such a circumstance, no judge can claim to have any manner of formally recognized "jurisdiction".
III. Regarding The "Adequate" Alternative Legal Remedies:
16. There seems a generally endorsed notion in the case law that absolute immunity can be challenged in the absence of adequate alternative legal remedies. Unfortunately, the case law doesn't provide a generally recognizable definition of "adequacy".
17. I would claim that without punishment, and in turn significant deterrence, the available remedies, or relief, offer the aggrieved nothing of value for what they have lost. Without compensation, there is no reclamation. A fact that also can not be fairly ignored, is the circumstance of the extra efforts, and investment of resources, required to "purchase", or pay for, what the courts euphemistically call an "adequate alternative".
18. The simple truth is, there is no available relief (in the absence of criminal prosecution and punishment) for the time and energy wasted, or the constitutional rights denied (even if only temporarily). To call getting (a year, and through added expenditure of monetary and intellectual capital) what I was entitled to in the first place "relief" is tantamount to describing-- not being mugged on the street-- as a "gift".
19. Evidence in this case related to charges against other parties will demonstrate, I think decisively, that the case law claimed alternative is neither compensatory, nor does it even have a minimum of sufficient reliability. In this case, I chose not to appeal, because I chose not to risk more money and energy on the very real possibility that I would just be paying more criminal judges, to ignore my papers, as they laughed their way to the bank with my money.
20. I state plainly, that pro se plaintiffs are distinctly disadvantaged in this justice process. The Court's compensate lawyers at no less than $150.00 an hour-- yet they won't provide exonerated pro se plaintiff's with 150 cents an hour for the expenditure of their time and intellectual capital. Pro se litigants are generally required to abide by the court rules with substantial sufficiency-- they are in fact required to do substantial specialized self-education to have any realistic hope of competitively surviving the process. The Court's ignore this fatiguing burden, and suggest that extra process, in all of its-- 9 bound copies with appropriate citation, and expensive fees and transcript splendor-- must not be any problem, because they are certainly well paid to provide the "service".
21. At best, appeals provide the scant promise of an appropriate do-over, and they do that minimum requiring a substantial price. Appeals don't (and can't practically) restore what has been lost (of course they can stop still incurring losses), and when denied the option of compensating punishment, I plainly claim, appeal action cannot be fairly described as relief, or a remedy.
IV. Regarding Citations and Authorities:
22. The case law on the issue, is as I describe it in these papers "mush".... In no published case I've seen, has any court done any cost-to-benefit-analysis, applying the appropriate standard of "strict scrutiny". As I see it, a convincing argument for, or against, judicial immunity has to be logic based, and not based on a legal history that contains convenient declarations (i.e. the public-interest is, or is intended to be, served) based on little, or no, rational theory or demonstrative evidence.
23. Applying another real world example: No rational person would suggest that we fix the problem of excessive litigation in the medical field by making doctor's absolutely immune to civil accountability for negligence. The obvious "real-world" consequence would be more negligence, and a general public so distracted by fear and mistrust, that system efficiency would be substantially compromised.
24. Their is no real world example where absolute immunity to accountability works... except perhaps when we bargain with criminals. The case law doesn't address that fact, and I would claim is invalidated for that negligent oversight. Having personally encountered (repeatedly, to the exclusion of anything else) the judicial arrogance, negligence, maliciousness... and General dysfunction, that judicial immunity reaps, I can certainly testify that for this disenfranchised American it has rendered the Bill of Rights moot, and irrelevant, and my American citizenship a fool's-gold style insult to my humanity.
25. The purpose in composing argument is to narrow, if not eliminate, the possibility of rational counter argument. If you are intent on narrowing argument, to what has been narrowly argued in the past in "published" case law --then I would suppose this argument was over before it began.
Case law relevant to the issues of immunity and jurisdiction doesn't talk of "court rules" and of the vital importance of obedience to the first priority of due process. Case law doesn't demonstrate a public interest fact, it merely proclaims it. To do justice I suggest you must step beyond the flawed case law and fairly judge the value of immunity against the value of the American Constitution you have sworn to protect, and I claim it's destroying.
26. I have substantial doubt that the substance of my argument will receive any counter argument from the defendant. Clearly he has an interest in keeping your focus on the narrow judicial history, where current practical consequences have no relevance. In simple truth, the high-price of immunity has been revealed through real experience, and it is past time the judiciary, pull its head out from the dirty sands of untimeless, logically weak, precedent, and take a good hard look at the ugly legacy.
V. Regarding Requested Suspension Of Discovery:
27. Based on purely circumstantial evidence, I have a concern that there may have been inappropriate conversation, or collusion, between Judge Cavanaugh, or his staff, and judge Dumont or other relevant state officials. There is a possibility that through discovery, this concern can be elevated to a formal claim, or made entirely moot for lack of substantiating evidence. While it was my first instinct not to oppose the suspension of discovery for the sake of expedience, on further consideration of the potential importance, of a finding of some sort of RICO style conspiratorial conduct, to the issue of immunity and jurisdiction, I feel compelled by a need to protect potential future interests, by having it on the record, that I opposed this request to suspend discovery/investigation.
VI. Near End Statement:
28. From the courts comfortable social, and professional, position I suspect he believes American justice to be a fine and splendid thing. From my uncomfortable social and professional position, I believe American justice absolutely sucks, and that it has been rendered by self-serving elitist corruption, routinely capable of disenfranchising Americans from their fundamental constitutional (and I would argue human) rights. Whether there's any hope of this process bridging any part of that humongous gap in perception will, at minimum, require finding some common expectations or ground.
29. Honesty and Integrity are words that mean something in my vocabulary. In a real sense they are commandments of my religion. I believe I have provided an argument that is unquestionably honest, and possesses rational, and logical, integrity. I would like to hope the court can share that opinion, and create the common ground of demanding no less from the defendant's, and from himself.
VII. Conclusion:
30. There exists substantial room to reasonably question the sufficient justice of absolute judicial immunity under the provisions of the United States Constitution, necessarily making summary endorsement inappropriate. Therefore, defendants' motion should be denied, and the issue should be fully tried in the hope of securing a more just resolution.
|