Plaintiff

                       Defendants 

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1. Regarding defendant's point I argument that:
THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO ELEVENTH AMENDMENT SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY.

2. For the record I will state the obvious, that the 11th Amendment makes no statement regarding any "absolute sovereign immunity". I would argue that the architects of the Constitution were very very literate men, and had they intended to make states immune from prosecution for state engineered violations of fundamental federal constitutional rights, they would have so stated. I also note that the Congress has not felt compelled to rewrite the 11th Amendment to say literally, what the courts "have interpreted" it to say.

3. Assuming (based on its decision on the previous related motion) this court has no sympathy for the argument that immunity is an abomination to the accountability that is the fabric of constitutional law, I will narrow my argument to what can be presumed to be this court's interpretation of the meaning of the 11th Amendment.

4. Court precedent is littered with two major exceptions to ELEVENTH AMENDMENT SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. One exception notes the "ongoing nature of a constitutional injustice" and the other notes the absence of "a plain and adequate remedy".

5. I plainly state that from my first encounter with the New Jersey Judicial System back in 1998 when I attempted to appeal excessive and unconstitutional cigarette taxation, I have not received any honest or constitutionally required due process, and that fact continues to be true through today... (this courts denial of "oral argument" without required argument on the subject, as example).

6. To this day, cigarettes continue to be excessively (unconstitutionally) taxed, now well over the 800% rate I originally attempted to have "redressed" by a court. In spite of an extensive expenditure of resources (relative to my income) and a diligent effort to comply with court rules, my original claims remain unaddressed by any relevant or accountable judicial decision. The claimed tyrannies related to cigarette taxation have in simple fact been ignored, and continue to be ignored, by courts of jurisdiction in violation of my due process rights.

7. As for the claims against the municipal governments: The inaction and malicious suppression of my claims in the courts of New Jersey has facilitated a clear and obvious escalation of the destruction of my first, seventh and 14th Amendment rights, as well as the destruction of statutory rights defined in legislation like the ADA, and NJLAD. To this very day, because of court collusion in criminal tyranny, I must endure a class of American citizenship where my house can be threatened to be condemned for merely attempting to exercise, the minor right, to equally speak at a town council meeting.

8. Clearly my claims made in this court do not merely seek restitution for past injustices... they seek the restoration of constitutional rights that continue to be suppressed and remain practically inaccessible. Therefore, a notion of 11th Amendment immunity is not applicable in this circumstance.

9. On the subject of the "no other adequate remedy exception", I would, I suppose pointlessly, direct you to the argument provided opposing the motion in the case of Judge Cavanaugh... no part of which did you address in your decision. As further argument, I would highlight one instance of abominable State Judicial process that clearly illustrates the inadequacy of the state provided "remedy". On appealing the vacant and irrelevantly formed decision in the cigarette tax case, the "remedy" provided fell so far short of anything approaching a constitutionally acceptable judicial process it was in fact a greater slander to justice than the misconduct being appealed.

10. To say it makes no logical sense that the Tax Court judge could have anticipated, and answered sufficiently-- in his decision-- every claim of reversible error I would later charge in my appeal, understates the ludicrous imbecility of the "remedy court's" decision. It is a practical truth, that it approaches impossibility to fairly argue/appeal a decision void of any articulated reasoning. A "remedy" court that only promises to, take your money, and a year of your life, to confuse issues with a blanket of authoritative indifference can be fairly considered a threat to justice. Such a court deserves the Seething Contempt I feel, and you deserve no less contempt, if you choose to ignore that practical fact and declare such a court a constitutionally acceptable "remedy".

11. Regarding defendant's point II argument that:
THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THE STATE DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL IMMUNITY.

12. In the previous Cavanaugh motion, I provided this court with reasoned argument on the subject that this court choose not to demonstrate to be logically refutable in its decision. Beyond that reasonable argument, I would direct the Court's attention to a recent third Circuit decision, NICHOLAS YARRIS v. COUNTY OF DELAWARE ....No. 05-1319 In that decision the court-- I certainly believe properly-- modifies prosecutorial "absolute immunity" into something certainly less than "absolute". If gross hypocrisy and duplicity were not to prevent The Judiciary from applying the same logical rules to itself, which it applies to others similarly situated-- the third circuit has certainly made it possible to "reasonably" argue against any presumption (declaration through summary judgment without any investigation/discovery) that any or all judicial conduct, is immune to civil prosecution.

13. I don't believe any reasonable argument can be framed to dispute the fact that a judiciary ( trial court, Appeals Court, and Supreme Court) willing to maliciously destroy litigation is any less a threat to justice than a prosecutor (and staff) willing to destroy evidence. The mere fact that there must be a tedious sifting of every circumstantial fact, and nuance of legal precedent, to find cause to hold people with power responsible for their abuses of power is itself a gross constitutional injustice. Thomas Jefferson built the Constitution on the principle that "one man's liberty ends, were another man's begins". ACCOUNTABILITY for trespasses against the rights and freedoms of others, isn't just the cornerstone of ethical law, it is its entire foundation.

14. The court no doubt needs to be reminded that this is a summary judgment motion (filed prior to discovery and no doubt to be decided without oral argument--over my objection) The burden is on the filing party to decidedly demonstrate that there is no reasonable possibility that any action by Judge Wilson or judge Dumont could possibly compromise their jurisdiction or claim of immunity. A fair "searching review" of the facts would demonstrate that both judges refused to comply with repeated requests for recusal, with cited causes ranging from gross incompetence, ignorance, and bigotry --to reference to the simple fact that the judges reside in the very town being sued and therefore by every probability are corrupted by an improper relationship to the defendant.

15. It should also be noted that there is rather clear circumstantial evidence of collusion and conspiracy. For example: After a motion for reconsideration, in which Judge Wilson aggressively pushed for mediation of the dispute, and contracted herself to provide a mediator-- without notice or explanation no mediation was provided and the case was re-venued to judge Dumont's court. The circumstance clearly points to a change in disposition that very likely lacks reasonable explanation beyond some secret cause for re-reconsideration.

16. Specific to judge Dumont's behavior, he not only contrived a preposterous, before trial--at trial--dismissal motion, which, over a year later, remains pending, he also refused to allow the complaint to be amended to include "smoking gun evidence" of malicious intent, and parties with residue on their hands. ...and Let's not forget his first official act of refusing a well articulated request for ADA accommodation. (unlike this court which only properly[?] ignored the request)

17. Making and breaking court rules is not proper judicial process and exclusive to perhaps just one occasion, it is the only process I have received, and the procedural record proves that fact. A fair minded "searching review" cannot lead to any other conclusion, and I defy this court, or any other court, to reasonably demonstrate, through articulated explanation, otherwise.

18. Regarding defendant's point III argument that:
THE COMPLAINT AGAINST THE STATE DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE DISMISSED PURSUANT TO THE ROOKER-FELDMAN ABSTENTION DOCTRINE.

19. Quoting from my complaint:
"If provided a fair opportunity, plaintiff will provide evidence, decisively demonstrating that the New Jersey court system is in fact plagued by a pervasive elitist and corrupting bigotry, and a gross disregard, for the United States Constitution, and "the rule of law" including their own rules of the court. The plaintiff will also provide conclusive evidence that the corruption and incompetence reaches all levels of the New Jersey Justice system and provides no realistic opportunity for self-correction or to make wrongs, right, within the system provided.

Put in simpler words, I claim that through out my encounters with the New Jersey courts system from Tax Court, to the Supreme Court of New Jersey, that I have not received one hour of honest, conscientious, or fair, "judicial judgment", and in turn my federal constitutional rights have been willfully violated by The State of New Jersey."

20. Clearly, this issue of discrimination and malicious destruction of constitutional rights by the judiciary was not litigated by any state court in any of my state actions.

21. My practical research capabilities are limited to what can be practically accessed on-line... I have in fact been unable to find any usefully complete, concise, are definitive explanation of THE ROOKER-FELDMAN ABSTENTION DOCTRINE and what would constitute requirements for application. Presumptively, from the case law I have read it would appear to be a requirement that there be complete or thorough adjudication of the issues in, or by, the state courts. I couldn't find any case where issues raised in state litigation (including constitutional issues) destroyed through summary judgment without discovery or oral argument was denied federal district court examination based on Rooker Feldman.

22. I would simply argue that the state is required to have "thoroughly examined" issues before they can be barred from federal district court redress. Considering the entire controversy doctrine effectively forces individuals to mix state and federal issues reckless application of such a doctrine could punish a litigant for being forced to rely on state enforcement of federal constitutional rights. Clearly knowing what I know now, I would, and will, advocate that anyone considering litigation, do everything they can do to tailor their litigation for federal court jurisdiction as this silly doctrine could foreclose them from practical access to any credible, constitutionally due, judicial process.

23. I believe there are numerous circumstances relevant to the processing of my state litigation that create substantial doubt regarding the appropriateness of applying Rooker Feldman. I will cite two specific examples:

24. In the cigarette tax litigation in an initial conversation with the judge in which he threatened me with a 5% penalty if I did not accept tax amnesty and withdraw my complaint... he also stated that he did not have jurisdiction over federal constitutional issues. This claim was repeated in a later conversation with the defense counsel (deputy attorney general). All process up to the judge's final decision took place without any explicit retraction of the statements. In his final decision, the judge apologized for "misspeaking" and claimed that he does in fact have jurisdiction over the constitutional issues.

25. Obviously under such a circumstance, it is fair to question whether the Tax Court had formally proper, or credible, jurisdiction over the federal constitutional issues raised in the litigation, and substantial reason exists to negate application of Rooker Feldman.

26. In the case against the Township of Mendham the judge clearly inappropriately applies a court rule of narrow purpose to dismiss the litigation and plainly states in her decision that the complaint may be refiled.

27. In closing on this subject, I would state that the state court cases are referenced as evidentiary material, and I am not requesting reinstatement of those exact cases. Certainly the constitutional issues raised, remain unaddressed, and I remain deprived of the substance of my constitutional rights.

Also certainly, I remain keenly interested in securing the meager fare judicial process required to restore my constitutional rights, and my existence as a rights endowed American citizen.

28. Regarding defendant's point IV argument that:
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1341, THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE WITH REGARD TO THE ASSESSMENT, LEVYING OR COLLECTION OF STATE TAXES.

29. Defendant states:
"In particular, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, the Tax Injunction Act, deprives the United States District Courts of jurisdiction to enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State."

30. Clearly the fact I seek opportunity to prove through this litigation is that the state does not provide "a plain, speedy and efficient remedy".

31. Defendant states:
"Plaintiff apparently availed himself of all of these remedies, but disagreed with the outcome. Complaint at pages 2-4. However, the fact that he did not agree with the outcome does not equate to his being without an adequate legal remedy in the state court system."

32. This being a motion for summary judgment I do not believe it is proper for the defendant to raise such an argument without providing substantial evidence that the "remedies" provided by the state was reasonably credible.

33. Contrary to its obligation the defendant has provided not one scintilla of evidence or logical argument to refute my "reasonable inference" that the remedy provided by the state was absolute garbage and fell miles short of the due process the Constitution guarantees.

34. Defendant states:
"Thus, this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's claims against the State in connection with its system of levying, assessing, collection of taxes. These claims against the State must be dismissed."

35. I have not asked this court to litigate these issues... what I have requested is fair access to a fair court of jurisdiction where I can fairly prosecute my claims and restore my constitutional rights. As stated, the state litigation is evidence, and not yet re-venued claims. Pointing out the obvious, the Division of taxation is not a defendant in this case so "dismissal" of the unmade "claims" against the nonexistent defendant would be ludicrous.

36. Regarding defendant's point V argument that:
NONE OF THE STATE DEFENDANTS IS A "PERSON" AS DEFINED IN 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

37. As this judge has found in previous cases a request for injunctive relief changes the scope of "personhood" under 1983.

38. As to the substance of this Catch-22... subsection (5) argument that the criminals are all immune to prosecution, I think it insults the intelligence that wrote The United States Constitution. Due process rights are not contingent on some enabling legislation, they are a constitutional guarantee. I would argue that part of that guarantee is written into the contract that states swear to the Union in joining it.

39. I would further state that when government officials swear allegiance to the United States of America and its constitution, they are making an explicit contract with the We the American people. A contract that should be practically enforceable somewhere within the judicial system.

40. Quoting a quote from NICHOLAS YARRIS v. COUNTY OF DELAWARE:
"In essence, the concept of due process requires that the government treat its citizens in an evenhanded and neutral manner; thus the targeting of specific individuals with the purpose of frustrating the exercise of their lawful rights contradicts the basic premise of the constitutional guarantee."

41. Regarding defendant's point VI argument that:
THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO PROPERLY ALLEGE A VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.

42. Obvious from defendant's extensive argument they understand that I'm complaining of denial of due process rights as "guaranteed" by the United States Constitution. I would argue that Constitutional due process requires the fulfillment of two components. First the process must be credible (ie. The state can't allow unqualified chimpanzees, for example, to serve as justices with federal constitutional jurisdiction.). Second the judicial process provided must be of reliably equal quality from person to person, claim to claim, with legal representation or without.

43. I would again remind the Court that this is a summary judgment motion, and it is the defendant's burden to decisively demonstrate, that what I claim and reasonably infer, cannot be reasonably sustained as fact.

44. Clearly there obligation requires them to effectively prove that the process I received was both credible (intellectually honest and obedient to rules of process) and that it was substantially equal to the Justice any others would likely receive in the state courts. Clearly the defense has not provided one scintilla of such evidence, and likewise no argument has been provided defending any specific violation of due process and I have claimed to have taken place.

45. Defendant council does reference R. 4:6-2(e) but there Quote of the state court rule is neither complete or accurate. I referenced this perversion of the rules in oral argument, and in my answer to the defendants' motion, in the relevant case.

46. Quoting from my answer to the motion:

"Regarding Defendants reference to rule...R. 4:6-2(e) as excuse for converting the motion in to one for summary judgment.... previous to a filed answer to the initial complaint."

The provision R. 4:6-2(e) states "If, on a motion to dismiss based on the defense numbered (e), matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided by R. 4:46, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material pertinent to such a motion."

Defendant attorney implies that they have provided "matters outside the pleading" -- Unfortunately, I can't argue against a implication that is baseless and unsupported by any facts.

Although I do not fully understand the purpose of R. 4:6-2(e)-Catch-22. I think it is quite obvious that the defendants have not provided any evidence that would justify suspending the normal process that requires a defendant to file an answer to the original complaint before a motion for summary judgment is to be considered.

Furthermore, summary judgment is not a casual process and a "letter brief" supported by absolutely no reference to, or provision of, evidence referenced in the original complaint cannot, on it's very face, be considered satisfactory support for such a motion."

47. For this motion for summary judgment to succeed the defendant should be properly obligated to defend the conversion of a letter brief, in lieu of answer, into a summary judgment motion--completely insufficient to its burden and in the absence of any articulated "matters outside the pleading" being presented--as due process.

48. As to the issue of jury trial I merely contend that I have an equal right to equal access to such a trial, and that for a court to do constitutionally required due process, a court must have a clear rule-disciplined procedure, or standards, for apportioning trials to avoid favoritism and discrimination. A right to trial defined by unprincipled judicial whim is not due process.

49. Regarding defendant's point VII argument that:
THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE JUDGES DUMONT AND WILSON ARE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY.

50. Defendant states:
Qualified immunity shields officials performing discretionary functions from civil liability unless they are "plainly incompetent or . . . knowingly violate the law."

51. As these are almost the exact charges in my complaint, this argument is nonsensical.

52. Defendant states:
"Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Judges Wilson or Dumont violated his clearly established constitutional rights..."

53. It would be nice if someone besides me where to interject here and point out to the defendant that there are burdens that come with filing a motion for summary judgment... and that those burdens are theirs. Give me my fair trial and I will demonstrate it conclusively, and beyond all reasonable doubt.

54. Defendant states:
"...nor that they would have any reason to understand that their actions in rendering decisions in cases brought by Plaintiff would violate his constitutional rights".

55. So when the judge repeatedly threatened me with a contempt citation for stating my belief that she was violating my constitutional rights.... that gave her no reason to understand that I thought she was violating my constitutional rights?

56. Furthermore when I told Judge Dumont that it was a violation of my constitutional rights to entertain a dismissal motion AFTER I had already survived summary judgment, there's no reasonable expectation that he could understand why such nonsense offends the due process GUARANTEED by the Constitution?

57. I think quite obviously qualified immunity can not be justified.

58. On the subject of Summary Judgment
As with conditional immunity for reasonable acts--applied appropriately--summary judgment is a reasonably efficient modification to the justice system. Unfortunately, bastardized by courts willing to continually cut corners, there is no longer enough of the core principle left, for this "technique" to do anything but abort justice (or throw babies out, with the bathwater). Put simply, summary judgment's intended purpose is to provide for expedited disposal of that which is "obviously" just dirty water. It does not exist to provide courts a convenient mechanism to grind babies they don't personally like into something they can just declare bathwater.

59. Context provided by previous rulings of this court, it is clear this court will not do any "searching review" of the facts--like for example, reading the relevant case files--and there is every probability the court will compose a judgment that does nothing to rationally challenge the core evidence and argument it will slander with irrelevancy.

60. The "burden" bound, "moving party", has not provided this court any evidence or argument that in any way refutes my claim that, from the trial courts, through the "relief courts" of New Jersey, I have not received any judicial process satisfactory to the reasonable standards one assumes constitutional due process would have to meet. If this court is going to deny discovery, deny complete argument, and deny complete ordered presentation of the evidence, than I charge that this court is duty bound to justify that decision by providing the refuting evidence, and relevant argument (defending the state process I received as constitutionally "due" process), the moving party did not provide.

61. On the subject of available relief:
A key component essential, to essentially all of the defendants' claims of immunity, is establishing "the actual fact" that the "available relief" the state provides is adequate to what the Constitution, and the provision of immunity, requires. I would claim the failure of the state relief safety-net documented in the case of Mosher verses the Division of taxation is so catastrophic, that unreliability is made obvious. Put simply, if someone can't spell "cat" you don't bother asking them to spell "hippopotamus". If you are only willing to only read one document from the case history... read the appeal brief... and then fulfill your duty to explain how this paragraph constitutes a due process acceptable definition of "relief":
"We affirm for substantially the reasons stated by Judge Kuskin in his bench rulings of June 21 and November 22. We have carefully reviewed the record on appeal, the arguments of the parties, and the applicable law and find the above arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E)".

62. It is wholly unreasonable to expect any sane person to invest (for a second or third time) hard money, their intellectual capital, and a year of their life, for an insult as gross as this preposterously described "relief"... add a unaccountable State Supreme Court willing to endorse the insult, and compound the financial injury, with complete indifference, and this "available" nightmare becomes the antithesis of constitutional due process "relief".

63. How many "strikingly" improper judicial procedures must I endure before the judicial system is appropriately ruled "out"-of-credibility?

64. Conclusion:
For the reasons stated, the serious claims made in my complaint regarding the abolishment of my American Constitutional Rights deserve thorough consideration, and a accountably complete decision from this court. Therefore, the motion to dismiss through summary judgment, without discovery, properly ordered evidence presentation, and complete argument, should be dismissed.